We study social choice mechanisms that aggregate individual preferences and select one among a finite set of alternatives. Our interest is in the existence of strategy-proof mechanisms under non quasi-linear utility functions. In the classical voting problem without money, the seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that if agents' preferences can be any ordering over the alternatives, the only deterministic, onto (i.e. every alternative can be selected) and strategy-proof mechanisms for three or more alternatives are dictatorial. On the other hand, with monetary transfers and quasi-linear utilities, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism maximizes social welfare in dominant strategies, and can be generalized to implement any affine maximizer of agents' values. By Roberts' theorem, with three or more alternatives, the weighted VCG mechanisms are essentially unique for the quasi-linear domain. However, quasi-linearity is a strong assumption, violated for example in domains with budget constraints, lack of liquidity, wealth effect or risk-aversion.
